Posted Monday 25th November 2013 03:17 GMT amanfromMars 1 ….. sharing novel news on http://forums.theregister.co.uk/forum/1/2013/11/24/linguistic_bodysnatchers_invade_the_nsa/
A sample of NSA feed seed designed to tell all in the manner of its handling ……… with the avoidance of ITs virtual engagement equally revealing to all 
It be not only NSA who be bombarded with new features and abilities which can massively expand controlled exploitation and power generation of the universal assets base, for all spooky intelligence agencies can host smarter programs if they choose to engage and employ them.

From: xxxx yyyyy
Subject: You have NEUKlearer HyperRadioProActive IT Mail and an Invite into Source Alien Intelligence with CyberIntelAIgent Control in Remote Virtual Systems Administrations
Date: 24 November 2013 11:38:12 GMT
To: nsaarc@nsaarc.net

Merry XSSXXXXmas ……… http://www.thedailybell.com/news-analysis/34767/Open-the-Window-and-Let-Out-Tedious-Tapering/#comment-1136679427

And yes, this is a live new GCHQ UKGBNI beta test of virtual communications collection systems into searching intelligence solutions.


nsaarc ….. http://www.nsa.gov/business/acq_resource_center/index.shtml
There’s more than just a little going on out there in IntelAIgent Space Places and the Live Operational Virtual Environment, El Reg, and none of it is minor.
Replying to a comment from dave jr on http://www.thedailybell.com/news-analysis/34767/Open-the-Window-and-Let-Out-Tedious-Tapering/
Hi,dave jr,
There is old saying/proverb ……. “You can take a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink”
Well, let’s take supposed intelligence agencies to the trough to find out if they be thirsty ……. http://forums.theregister.co.uk/forum/1/2013/11/24/linguistic_bodysnatchers_invade_the_nsa/#c_2036544
After all, we wouldn’t want them to collapse with a peculiar phorm of intelligence dehydration/information deficit whenever whatever is needed is so easily supplied. That would plainly be real stupid of them, wouldn’t it?
Posted Monday 25th November 2013 08:55 GMT amanfromMars 1 …. bearing gifts on http://forums.theregister.co.uk/forum/1/2013/11/24/linguistic_bodysnatchers_invade_the_nsa/
Thinking of better things already on their merry way might be a real good thing:-)

As language is so closely related to thinking, could this mean the spooks might be PHBd/white-anted/sabotaged into paralysis eventually as their minds collapse under the verbiage. …. Denarius Posted Monday 25th November 2013 07:14 GMT

Here be earlier commissioned evidence from the CIA … [ANALYTIC CULTURE IN THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (2005) Dr Rob Johnston ……. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/cia-analytic-culture.pdf …. which more suggests that spooks don’t think nearly well enough at all to be an effective leading driver force, Denarius.
And yes, Words Control and Power Worlds is not just an Alien Concept and Precept and ProgramMING Project

Despite the seemingly private and psychological nature of analysis as defined in the literature, what I found was a great deal of informal, yet purposeful collaboration during which individuals began to make sense of raw data by negotiating meaning among the historical record, their peers, and their supervisors. Here, from the interviews, is a typical description of the analytic process:

When a request comes in from a consumer to answer some question, the first thing I do is to read up on the analytic line. [I] check the previous publications and the data. Then, I read through the question again and find where there are links to previous products. When I think I have an answer, I get together with my group and ask them what they think. We talk about it for a while and come to some consensus on its meaning and the best way to answer the consumer’s question. I write it up, pass it around here, and send it out for review.

The cognitive element of this basic description, “when I think I have an answer,” is a vague impression of the psychological processes that occur during analysis. The elements that are not vague are the historical, organizational, and social elements of analysis. The analyst checks the previous written products that have been given to consumers in the past. That is, the analyst looks for the accepted organizational response before generating analytic hypotheses.

The organizational-historical context is critical to understanding the meaning, context, and process of intelligence analysis. There are real organizational and political consequences associated with changing official analytic findings and releasing them to consumers. The organizational consequences are associated with challenging other domain experts (including peers and supervisors). The potential political consequences arise when consumers begin to question the veracity and consistency of current or previous intelligence reporting. Accurate or not, there is a general impression within the analytic community that consumers of intelligence products require a static “final say” on a given topic in order to generate policy. This sort of organizational-historical context, coupled with the impression that consumers must have a final verdict, tends to create and reinforce a risk-averse culture.

Once the organizational context for answering any given question is understood, the analyst begins to consider raw data specific to answering the new question. In so doing, the analyst runs the risk of confirmation biases. That is, instead of generating new hypotheses based solely on raw data and then weighing the evidence to confirm or refute those hypotheses, the analyst begins looking for evidence to confirm the existing hypothesis, which came from previous intelligence products or was inferred during interactions with colleagues. The process is reinforced socially as the analyst discusses a new finding with group members and superiors, often the very people who collaborated in producing the previous intelligence products. Similarly, those who review the product may have been the reviewers who passed on the analyst’s previous efforts.

This is not to say that the existing intelligence products are necessarily inaccurate. In fact, they are very often accurate. This is merely meant to point out that risk aversion, organizational-historical context, and socialization are all part of the analytic process. One cannot separate the cognitive aspects of intelligence analysis from its cultural context.

And as for current incumbent heads of British Intelligence Services …. well, forget about any of those as being smart enough to be able to influence and direct anything whenever they have to be appraised of questions before an event …. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2508779/Spy-chiefs-fed-questions-advance-parliamentary-committee-hearing.html to be able to answer anything from something as contrived and self-serving as a Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee …. http://www.aworldtowin.net/blog/parliament-is-spooked-by-spooks.html
Sorry, chaps, but you cannot avoid the truth of the present situation with its political incorrect and inept pantomime.

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